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ANOMALOUS INDORSEMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA.
When one, not a payee or maker, indorses a note for the
purpose of giving the maker of it credit with the payee, and
before the note has been indorsed by the payee, he is called
an anomalous indorser. It is the impression, in Pennsylvania,
that there is no way in which to hold such an indorser.
A wishes to borrow $Iooo and B offers to lend it if A will
give security. Accordingly a note is made-payable to B.
signed by A as maker, and indorsed by C to give it credit with
B, who then parts with his $Iooo to A. The attitude of the
Pennsylvania courts, it is thought, is : that B cannot hold C;
that a subsequent holder who has notice of the circumstances
of the indorsement cannot hold C; and that it is sufficient
notice of these circumstances if B's name appears on the back
below C's. A doctrine of this sort is admitted to be not
altogether satisfactory; for, in the first place, it is opposed to
the law of, perhaps, every jurisdiction in which negotiable
instruments are in use; and because, secondly, it is a result
which our sense of natural justice instinctively condemns; but
still it is reinforced by a respectable opinion that on principle it
is correct and that any contrary doctrine is not. Under such
circumstances two questions are naturally suggested. Is it
really inconsistent with the legal theory of notes to hold an
anomalous indorser ? And if not, have the cases, nevertheless,
settled the question beyond hope of being corrected ?
The first question has been so much discussed that one
need not attempt to add anything to what has already been
said upon it. My purpose in going into it is to get together
some material that will be of help in answering the second.
that is, in clarifying the cases, and so to find out exactly- on
what terms Penn~ylvania really is with the subject.
Putting the intimation already thrown out into the shape of
a proposition, we may start out by saying that it is not incon-
sistent with legal theory to attach a liability to an anomalous
indorser; and since, to prove this. it is obviously necessary to
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show only how he can be held, lack of patience drives us at
once to the consideration of this narrower question. Now,
however much we may be bent upon holding him to some.
liability, we will quickly make up our minds not to hold him
to a liability that does not fit his intention. It is unfair, for
instance, to hold him as a maker or guarantor, for he did not
intend to assume the liability of either of these. He intended
to be liable only after the maker; and, although he under-
stood himself to be liable secondarily, it was not necessarily as
a guarantor. He expected, furthermore, to be liable only
upon demand and notice; to make him a maker or guarantor
dispenses with these. Pennsylvania, in the early cases, did not
notice these objections and the disposition to hold him as a
guarantor was almost crystallized into a settled'doctrine. Of
course, there was no injustice in those cases in which there
was notice; and 6ne is not disposed to object seriously to a
case which it is better to know is settled than how. But the
mistake led to holding the indorser even where there was no
notice and so imposed a different liability from what was
assumed. Both these errors were soon unconsciously corrected
by the Statute of 1885, which not only required guaranties to
be in writing, but did not have that requirement satisfied by
simple indorsement. Corrected? Yes, but not entirely; an
opportunity was open to start on the right track. Instead, the
courts made another and more serious mistake; they assumed
that if the anomalous indorser could not be held as guarantor,
he could not be held at all-this without really any attempt
whatever at hunting for another liability.
Why not hold him as an indorser? That certainly is the
very liability he intended to assume, and, besides, demand and
notice are necessary to hold him as such ; so that the objec-
tions that keep him from being responsible as a maker or
guarantor are got rid of. It has, therefore, been suggested
that he should be held as a first indorser, because "the prior
party's position on the note seems to render his liability
strictly analagous to that of the drawer of a bill upon the
maker in favor of the payee." 1 There is something clumsy in
Daniel, Sect. 714.
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this suggestion and, besides, no one but a payee can be first
indorser.
A better and more scientific theory, 'it seems, has been
adopted by the New York court. The payee, as holder, is
allowed to sue the anomalous indorser as second indorser, and
the objection that he cannot recover on the ground that he in
turn would be liable as first indorser, is answered by saying
that that defence of avoidance of circuity of action is not avail-
able, inasmuch as the circumstances of the indorsement show
that the anomalous indorser was not to hold the payee.'
'Professor Ames, in his summary,' states it more simply: "The
-,payee as holder, may obviously indorse the instrument to the
surety without recourse, and may also fill up the blank
indorsement of the surety to himself. In this way the parties
.are placed in the same position as if the maker had, in the first
instance, delivered the note to the payee, the payee had then
indorsed it without recourse to the surety, and the surety had
then indorsed it to the payee. In both cases the payee, as second
indorsee, charges the surety as second indorser." It has been
hinted as an objection to this, that the payee has no authority
to indorse "without recourse; " but the answer is that it is
not a question of having authority at all. The payee is allowed
to bring out matter which will prevent the anomalous indorser
from setting up the defence of circuity of action; and indorse-
ment "without recourse" is nothing more than a convenient
way of putting down this result. And if it be said that this
-is really introducing parol evidence to vary a written contract,
the answer is that it is not a matter of evidence: the payee
-may bring in under an equitable defence the same matter
which, before the introduction of equitable defences, would
have entitled him to an injunction preventing the anomalous
indorser from suing him as first indorser; and, certainly, he
may prove his case.
Settling ourselves down, then, upon the fact, as it seems
proper we may, that the payee as second indorsee may
hold the surety as second indorser, and remembering also
I Moore v. Cross, 19 N. Y. 227 (1859).
2 2 Ames, B. & N., 838.
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that notice is necessary to charge an indorser, we are in a fair
way to examine the cases with some sense. Our first refresh-
ing surprise is to find how few and of what sort the authorities,
are; in perhaps not more than four cases was the question
involved and in those the discussion is not apt to meet with
approval.
In every other case there is something distinguishable. In
the cases in which there was no demand or notice it was
proper not to hold the defendant. Such were McCune v.
Taylor,' and Barto v. Schmeck.' Such, probably, we may also
take Schollenberger v. Neff,' and Fegenbush v. Lang,4 to be
from the mere fact that it does not appear that there was.
notice, and although the defendants in both cases were held,
the result is unsatisfactory and must be due to starting with
the mistaken notion that guaranty is the proper action. In
Shenk v. Robeson,' and Jack v. Morrion,6 nothing is said about
notice. The second simply decides that a mere indorsement
is not sufficient writing to satisfy the statute. In all these
cases excepting Shenk v. Robeson, the action was on a guar-
anty and any discusssiori in them would have little weight in
an action on an indorsement. Even had there been notice, it
would have been a sufficient answer to say that plaintiff has
misconceived his action. One case-Smith v. Kessle9- did
say that upon indorsement alone, the surety is not liable to the
payee. Of course, the payee must meet the defence of
avoidance of circuity of action and so the burden is upon
him to show that the surety was not to have recourse
to him.
In only one case before Schafer v. The Bank,8 does it
appear that the defendant had notice, and in that he was held
liable to a holder who took from the payee after maturity.
rII Pa. 46o (1849).
28 Pa. 447 (1857).
3 28 Pa. 189 (1857).
' 28 Pa. 193 (I857).
5 2 Grant, 372 (i858).
648 Pa. 113 (1864).
'48 Pa. 142 (r863).
59 Pa. I44 (1868).
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Inasmuch as the holder took the note subject to equities, the
case practically decides that payee may recover.'
This, then, is the state of the authorities when we come to
Schafer v. The Bank,2 which is considered the leading case-a
distinction due, however, not so much to its solid reasoning
and faithful examination of the cases as to its presumptuous-
ness in putting itself down as settling the question for all
time. Solomon Schafer was the indorser of a note payable to
Jacob and Joseph Schafer. The payees, having indorsed
below Solomon Schafer's name, had the note discounted at
the plaintiff bank, and it was held that plaintiff could not re-
cover, although there was demand and notice. There were
two counts-the first was on guaranty; the second charged
defendant as second indorser, alleging that payees were first
indorsers.
Justice Sharswood was anxious not to depart from the au-
thorities. " Our unanimous conclusion," he says, "is to ad-
here to these decisions," and he overruled the only case
(Kyner v. Shower) that was on all fours with the one he was
deciding. He goes on, "But were there more doubt as to
the soundness of the principle settled in Barro v. Schrmeck and
Jack v. Morrison than there is, we ought not now to depart
from them," not recognizing that not only demand and notice
distinguished the cases, but that those cases were on actions
of guaranty, while here there was a count on the indorsement.
This failure to apprehend the subject clearly is noticed also in
the examination of the cases. Taylor v. AcCune and Barto v.
Schmeck and other cases do not have their decisions stated
with the exactness we should expect. It is more than doubt-
ful, too, if Justice Sharswood is justified in his criticism of
Justice Gibson's remarks in Kyner v. Shower. The statement
in that case--" and when there is no such proof, he authorizes
the payee to write over his name any form of engagement he
may see proper "-may be fairly interpreted to be nothing more
than a statement of what Justice Gibson himself conceived the
law to be rather than a statement of what he supposed Taylor
I Kyner v. Shower, 13 Pa. I44 (i85o).
2 59 Pa. 144 (1868).
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v. M Cune established. And although it may not be quite ac-
curate, its aspect is considerably altered when it is read in the
light of the facts of Kyner v. Shower.
From Justice Sharswood's whole discussion it is evident
that the case was practically decided on the first count, and
that it was assumed that there was no liability on the second.
It may be worth while to look into the reason for this assump-
tion. We find, in the first place, that it is traceable in some mea-
sure to the introduction of presumptions that seem to serve
no purpose but that of confusing the subject. In Taylor v.
McCuine, Bell, J., says of T7I/man v. Wheeler, which he con-
siders decisive of his case, that it decided that "there was
nothing to disprove the legal presumption flowing froni the
appearance of the paper; that T. put his name to it as
second indorser, on the responsibility of the payee, and for
the accommodation of the drawers and payee, as first in-.,
dorser." In this case and its partner, Herrick v. Carman,*
it did not appear that the indorser intended to be anything
more or less than a second indorser, with the privileges that
go with that position, one of which is to look back to the
payee as first indorser. In other words, the payee did not
show that there were circumstances which would deny the
right of the surety to have recourse to him. There was not
this difficulty in McCune v. Taylor, for there it appears that
Taylor indorsed to give the note credit with the payee; and,
therefore, the New York cases were not in point. When
nothing appears except the indorsement, it is hard to see what
need there is for a presumption; when, on the other hand,
it appears that the indorsement was to give credit with the
payee, it is contrary to the fact to say that the surety is pre-
sumptively a second indorser upon the responsihility of the-
payee. The significant result-and it is perhaps traceable to
this misapplication of the New York cases-is that Pennsyl-
vania, while pretending to follow New York, has reached an
opposite result-New York having found no difficulty what-
1 i7Johns. 325 (IS2o).
2 12 Johns. 159 (1815).
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ever, consistently with Tillman v. Wheeler and Herrick v. Car-
man, in holding the surety.
Another notion that has helped along this assumption that
a surety cannot be held, was introduced in Barto v. Schmeck.
Woodward, J., says: "There was no proof to charge Barto
with liability to the payee, and he could be made liable to
Schmeck as a subsequent holder only by the payee's assum-
ing the responsibility of first indorser. . . It was a fraud on
Barto, therefore, for Mannerback (the payee) to indorse below
him and to negotiate the note to Schmeck without himself
assuming the responsibility of a first indorser. And Schmeck
took the note, with his eyes wide open to the fact that Man-
nerback was the payee and could not regularly be second in-
dorser. This was a circumstance sufficient to discredit the
commercial character of the paper and to put Schmeck upon
inquiry," etc. The court thought that Mannerback was not
first indorser, because he signed below Barto ; but is the posi-
tion of the names to determine whether or no one is a first in-
dorser? It seems it ought to be- immaterial on what part of
the paper the payee writes his name so long as he puts it down
as a first indorsement. In other words, is it not simply a
question of what was the payee's intention when he indorsed ?
It seems so; and hence that intention becomes a matter of in-
quiry for us. Now, it is surely not easy to impute one or
another definite intention to a payee who has indorsed below
the anomalous indorser, when we know that he indorsed in a
half-mechanical way, as a matter of course in business, with-
out any contemplation of the legal refinements that are likely
to arise. On the other hand, however, it is not positively
stupid for us to say that he meant his indorsement to be an
indorsement, and hence meant it to pass legal title and to
make a contract just as other indorsements do. But a payee
can transfer legal title only by becoming first indorser, for the
reason that otherwise a subsequent holder does not come
within the tenor of the bill; and, therefore, the fair and natural
interpretation of his act is that he did become first indorser.
A further objection to Justice Woodward's dictum is the
disastrous result that would come from following it out logi-
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cally. If it is to put a purchaser on inquiry when the payee's
name is below that of the anomalous indorser, why not when
his name is written across the face or lengthwise on the back,
or in any other of the numerous positions that may be imag-
ined ? To put him on inquiry in a particular case seems
nothing less than arbitrary. And what would the result be
but to lessen the freedom of currency of negotiable instru-
ments, while the drift of the law merchant is in the opposite'
direction.
" Sharswood, J., of course, had to admit that if the payee in-
dorsed " without recourse" above the surety, then, as to bona
fide holders, the surety would certainly be conclusively bound
to answer as second indorser; but he claimed that, if 'the
surety was sued by the payee in the character of subsequent
indorser, he undoubtedly could show that in fact such re-
stricted indorsement was not made until after he had signed,
and, as to any liability to the payee, it may well be questioned
whether it would not be a mere evasion of the statute that
was intended to prevent perjuries as well as frauds." Accord-
ing to this the bona fide holder may sue the surety, who will
then have no recourse to the payee as first indorser "without
recourse," or he may sue the payee, who, we may suppose,
has also signed as third indorser, and the payee cannot hold
the surety; so that it is to depend entirely upon the holder,
who is to pay the note-the surety or the payee. The trouble
seems to be that Justice Sharswood fixes the liability of the
surety to the holder by the law merchant (not incorrectly);
but when he comes to the liability of the surety to the payee
(as second indorsee), he brings in the statute-for what reason
it is not easy to understand.
Only two cases can be said in any way to follow Schafer v.
The Bank. With the admission in Murray v. McKee,' that
"it was rightly decided if Jack v. Morrison is to be considered
law" there could, of course, be no other conclusion. The
other case is Hauer & McNair v. Patterson, in which Shars-
wood with fatal consistency held that an anomalous indorser
'6o Pa. 35 (xS68).
284 Pa. 274 (1877).
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who took up a note could recover against the payee as first
indorser, a conclusion the very opposite of which a good case,
Moore v. Cross I says no one would doubt.
The last case, Arnot v. Symonds,2 on anomalous indorse-
ment may be consistent with Schafer v. The Bank, but the test
which it adopts goes far toward relaxing the doctrine of that
case. When Arnot purchased the note the payee's name ap-
peared in the proper place on the back, while that of the
anomalous indorser was at the opposite end and inverted with
respect to the payees'. It was held that the holder could re-
cover against the anomalous indorser. The court says, "If
the defendant, in case he is required to pay, will have recourse
to the payees, it follows that he is liable as second indorser to
the holder. Whether he would have such recourse or not is
really the test of liability. . . The legal effect of placing
their (the payees') name where it is, is to make them liable as
first indorsers." This test has the advantage of doing away
with the subject of inquiry and notice which we have seen
occasioned some confusion in the- earlier cases. Suppose, for
instance, a payee comes to A with a note he has not yet in-
-dorsed, but upon which there appears the name of the anom-
alous indorser, then indorses the note above the anomalous
indorser and gets the money from A. According to the test
laid down here A may recover, even though he has had notice
of the character of the indorsement. But, however satisfac-
tory the test may be in such a case, the objection to it is that
it will not work where the payee indorses "without recourse"
above the name of the surety; for the surety will not then
have recourse to the payee, and yet it can hardly be doubted
that he would be liable to a bona fide holder. A further ob-
jection to the reasoning in this case is the arbitrariness with
which the rule is laid down that the liability of the indorser
depends upon the position of the *payee's name. That is, if
the payee indorses in position A, the surety is to be held; if
one or two inches from position A, he is not to be held. When
recovery thus becomes a matter of inches it seems you are
i 19 N. Y. 227 (859).
85 Pa. 99 (877).
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getting pretty close to the borderland of absurdity. But
besides this there is the difficulty in applying such a rule.
Suppose the payee's name were below that of the surety, but
in the right direction, while that of the surety is inverted, or
suppose payee wrote his name lengthwise along the back, will
the test help you very much in determining whether or no
payee is first indorser? The simple and workable rule is to
say that it is immaterial where payee writes his name; how-
ever inartistic its position with reference to other names, it is
still a first indorsement if meant to be such.
We have noticed that it seemed improper and confusing in
such cases as Barto v. Schmeck and Schafer v. The Bank to
say that the position of the name of the first indorser below
that of the second was sufficient to put plaintiff upon inquiry.
A case-Loosee v. Bissell--? now came up in which that ques-
tion would seem, upon first blush, to have been correctly in-
troduced. The payee of a note that had been indorsed by an
anomalous indorser pledged the note as collateral security
with the plaintiff bank, but did not indorse it; subsequently
he had it discounted by the bank and then indorsed it. The
bank was not allowed to recover on the ground that the facts
were sufficient to put it upon inquiry. Of course, a transferee
of a note is taken to have notice of what appears on the note,
and in that sense it can, indeed, be said that the holder here
was put upon inquiry. But that inquiry would develop the
fact merely that the transfer of the note without indorsement
of the payee would operate only as an assignment of the
payee's interest, and that that interest from the very face of
the paper could be nothing more than a right against prior
parties. In other words there was no assignment in any sense
of any right-legal or equitable-against the surety, and it is
irrelevant, therefore, to bring in any talk of notice of equities
that he may have against the payee. More than this, it seems
quite inaccurate to speak of the equities of the subsequent
holder against the payee. An indorser always recovers on
his legal title and the question strictly is not whether he has
' 76 Pa. 459 (1874).
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an equity against the payee, but whether the payee has an
equitable defence to the legal action. The defence to plain-
tiff's action here was not that he had notie, but that he had
not given value. The money that he paid in the first instance
was in consideration of what was then assigned him, and at
that time he got no right against the surety. True, the sub-
sequent indorsement by the payee gave him legal title, but at
that time he gave no value for the right, and hence is not a
purchaser for value.
A few more cases are usually cited under the head of anom-
alous indorsement that have no business to be. Filbert v.
Finkbeiner' merely decides that you may prove a guaranty if
you have a writing. In Temple v. Baker,2 the question was
simply whether there was a memorandum in writing sufficient
to satisfy the statute.
In Slack v. Kirk,3 the discussion of anomalous indorsement
with the subsequent supposedly necessary adherence to Schafer
v. The Bank, gives an awkwardness to the case from which it
ought to be free. Slack, the payee, indorsed the note as first
indorser. Subsequently, Kirk indorsed the note, but inadvert-
ently wrote his name above that of the first indorser. It was
held that Kirk, who when the note fell due paid half of it to
the subsequent holder, could not recover from Slack. The
theory of the court was that Kirk could be subrogated to the
rights of the holder and so recover from Slack, while Slack
could not hold Kirk because Kirk was an anomalous indorser.
The result was satisfactory; the theory, rather otherwise; for
the case seems capable of the simple explanation that a second
indorser may hold a first. The contention that this is not so
when the name of the second appears above that of the first
seems so weak that one hardly stops to consider it. If an
answer were needed it would be sufficient to say that it can be
shown by parol matter that the second indorser put his name
above by mistake.
The latest case cited under anomalous indorsement is Cen-
1 68 Pa. 243 (x871).
2 125 Pa. 634 (1889).
3 67 Pa. 38o (1871).
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tral National Bank v. Dreydoppel.' A note was made by J. &
E., payable to their own order, and indorsed by defendant, and
subsequently by the makers themselves. The court accounts
for the refusal of the cases to allow recovery against the
anomalous indorser on the ground that he had no recourse to
the payee; but it contends that the reason fails in the present
case because he has recourse to the payees as makers, and
that he should therefore be held. Again the result is correct,
but again the question of anomalous indorsement has no
business to be discussed. A man cannot promise himself, and
so a note payable to the maker is incomplete-is not a note
and does not become such until after the maker indorses it.
At that time the effect of the indorsement is to make a con-
tract with the indorsee and so complete the note.2 This in-
dorsement, however, is not a strict indorsement, for that is .a
transfer or pre-existing liability, and here there is no such lia-
bility. The maker, by putting his own name down as payee,
reserves the designation of the payee for a future time and his
subsequent indorsement is merely this designation of the payee;
so that the apparent anomalous indorser is really the first
indorser, and hence there is nothing irregular about the note.
I have gone into the cases sufficiently, I think, to show that
they are, at least, not very satisfactory. In not one of them
does there seem to be a clear apprehension of the subject; in
most of them anomalous indorsement did not require discus-
sion; in those that it did the reasoning could be sounder. And
it is more than just possible, too, that it may be fairly said that
it has really not been settled in Pennsylvania that an anom-
alous indorser who gets notice cannot be held. It is certain,
at any rate, that the authorities are in such a shape that stare
dedsis loses much of its nightmare effect. That principle,
after all, it may sometimes be only the next best thing to
follow with conscious blindness; the very best thing may be
to disregard it intelligently.
George Stern.
Philadelphia; March, 1899.
I34 Pa. 499 (118o).
2 Hooper v. Williams, 2 Exch. z8.
